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Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee
Abstract
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which controls the supply of money in the United States,
may be the country’s most important agency.1 The chair of the committee is often dubbed the second most
powerful person in Washington, only deferring to the President himself.2 Financial scholars and analysts
obsess over the institution, leading to a rich tradition of FOMC Kremlinology, veneration, and second-
guessing in business schools and economics departments.
But legal scholars have been less entranced by the committee—put off, perhaps, by the fact that the institution
has never been checked by the courts or by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4 As a result, there has
been no effort to come to grips with the administrative law of the FOMC; this article seeks to redress that gap.
The FOMC enjoys a legal mandate that shields its discretion to a remarkable degree. The principal claim here
is that this shield, combined with the imperatives of bureaucratic organization in an institution whose raison
d’etre is stability, has turned the FOMC into an agency governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of
externally imposed constraints. The makeup of the committee, the materials that it consults before rendering
monetary policy decisions, its voting mechanisms, and the way its decisions are promulgated are products of a
mélange of evolving tradition and statutory permissiveness. One might argue that some combination of law
and tradition explains what happens in most agencies. But the degree of reliance on tradition sets the FOMC
apart. No one worries about the customs governing evidence presentation and voting order on multimember
boards like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
but they are subjects of scrutiny at the FOMC. By the same token, APA law, rather than traditions such as that
of the FOMC’s so-called “beige book,” governs what goes into the record before, say, the EPA or Commerce
Department make their factual findings.5 And Supreme Court decisions like Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. mean that the decisions rendered by most agencies are
substantially lengthier, and strive for substantially less ambiguity, than those of the FOMC.6 It is possible that
this sort of development of routinized custom might be expected for agencies with few legal constraints. If so,
the FOMC is a fine example of an institutional tendency, one that might have particular application in other
forms of financial regulation. A mix of tradition and legal constraint are a feature of administrative constraint
in that field, where litigation providing definitive opinions on required process is rare, and informal—and
often nontransparent—oversight a norm. An account of the FOMC that jibes with the way this sort of
regulation works might serve as a prod or a comparator for other accounts of the administrative law of
financial oversight.
Given this theme, the article makes the following additional points:
1. The FOMC enjoys the sorts of broad delegations that other New Deal agencies benefit from, only more so;
the orders issued by the committee at the conclusion of each of its eight annual meetings do not fit within the
traditional paradigms of administrative rulemaking or adjudication, leading courts to eschew any effort to
review those decisions as committed to the agency’s discretion.7
2. Given its free hand, the FOMC might be expected to be an empire builder. But in reality, it has only
expanded its remit with regard to the sort of transactions it takes on, which have moved beyond the purchase
and sale of federal government debt to include positions in a broader range of financial assets, as the financial
crisis exemplified.
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3. The modest problems that the FOMC has endured at the hands of the branches that monitor independent
agencies like it—the courts and Congress—have reflected its extraordinary independence and relative
opacity. The courts have turned away a series of plaintiffs, including two senators, concerned about the breath
of the delegation of power over the economy to the committee and the mechanism of appointment of
committee members. Congress has occasionally fretted about the black box within which the committee
makes its economy-changing decisions. However, in 1990, Congress removed legislation passed in the 1970s
designed to require more reporting from the committee, suggesting that it, too, is cowed by the idea of
subjecting the agency to much legislative oversight.8
4. The committee makes decisions in a procedurally consistent but increasingly lengthy and elaborate way.
Simple correlations between the transcripts of these meetings (length, size, mood, number of times the chair
spoke), the ultimate decision made by the FOMC, and a number of leading economic indicators found one
intriguing relationship between attendance and the direction of the federal funds rate.9 There may be some
promising research directions available for this sort of analysis.
If the above observations are meant to make a descriptive case about the way the FOMC makes decisions, the
question arises whether we should regret its distance from traditional sorts of administrative procedure. The
FOMC’s procedural uniqueness is a function of its independence; that independence isjustly celebrated. We
can live with the irregularities and experiments offered by the idiosyncratic procedures of financial regulation
in general, and with the FOMC in particular, though comfort with the independence of the committee does
not excuse unfamiliarity with the way it operates.
It is accordingly worth determining how the FOMC does its business, and no scholar has yet done so. This
lack of coverage by legal scholars of the rules and culture surrounding open market operations is not, to be
sure, a terrible dereliction of duty. Administrative lawyers often assume that the subjects they study
closely—rulemaking and adjudication by agencies—are quite different from other services provided by the
government, including block grants, the management of state-owned enterprises, and, indeed, the oversight of
interest rates. These lawyers do not necessarily claim that administrative scholarship should cover the entire
waterfront of government action. Moreover, from a disciplinary perspective, although lawyers are very much
engaged in financial supervision—that is, the way that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) regulates banks—they
have little to do with either the decisionmaking by the FOMC, which expands or shrinks the nation’s
monetary supply, or the implementation of its open market orders, which is done by the traders who staff the
New York Fed’s open market operations desk.
Although these are all good reasons not to place the scrutiny of the government’s open market operations
agency at the top of every scholar’s agenda, they do not justify ignorance of the committee. Any lawyer
interested in institutional design ought to be interested in the design of one of the government’s signature
institutions; by the same token, knowing how law constrains the least rule-bound or adjudicatory of agencies
essays an outline of the reach of these legal constraints.
In part III of this article, the legal constraints of the FOMC are considered in the classical administrative law
vein. As this article discusses, those constraints have not limited the discretion of the FOMC, which enjoys a
remarkable degree of independence from Congress, the executive, and the judiciary. Nonetheless, the
limitations on the freedom of committee members to do as they wish are reviewed to give the reader a
comprehensive sense of how the law, as expressed by the actual practice of the courts and Congress, have
constrained the agency. But the analysis of how the FOMC operates begins in part II, where the way that the
constraints that do exist have affected the agency’s decisionmaking process is considered. A brief conclusion
ends the analysis.
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LAW AND CUSTOM ON THE FEDERAL 
OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE 
 
  DAVID ZARING* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which controls the supply 
of money in the United States, may be the country’s most important agency.1 
The chair of the committee is often dubbed the second most powerful person in 
Washington, only deferring to the President himself.2 Financial scholars and 
analysts obsess over the institution, leading to a rich tradition of FOMC 
Kremlinology, veneration, and second-guessing in business schools and 
economics departments.3 
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 1.  Gerald Dunne has suggested that the FOMC be renamed the National Monetary Policy 
Commission, “so as to reflect what the Committee really is.” Gerald T. Dunne, A Central Bank for the 
Third Millennium, 113 BANKING L.J. 327 (1996). The “may” exists partly to hedge on the possibility 
that a committee of officials of the Federal Reserve System would be considered an agency, though 
under 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012), they likely would meet the test (the White House, for what it is worth, 
does not constitute an agency under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)). See id. (defining 
agency as “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject 
to review by another agency”).  
 2.  See Michelle C. Bligh & Gregory D. Hess, The Power of Leading Subtly: Alan Greenspan, 
Rhetorical Leadership, and Monetary Policy, 18 LEADERSHIP Q. 87, 89 (quoting Brady Willet, As 
Greenspan Bids Adieu, Say Hello to Uncertainty, FALLSTREET.COM (May 18, 2005), 
http://www.fallstreet.com/may1805.php); Henry W. Chappell, Jr., et al., Partisan Monetary Policies: 
Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment, 108 Q.J. OF ECON. 185, 191 (1993) (citing a 
U.S. News and World Report annual ranking of powerful individuals that placed the Federal Reserve 
Chairman second); William A. Kelly, Jr., et al., Should We Sell the Fed?, 8 CATO J. 125, 128 (1988) 
(“The chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has been called the second most powerful man in 
America.”). 
 3.  This obsession has led to numerous publications in popular media as well as academic sources. 
See, e.g., Janet Yellen, The View from Inside the Fed, in THE TAYLOR RULE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF MONETARY POLICY (Evan F. Koenig et al. eds., 2012) (describing the influence 
of the famous Taylor Rule, which offers guidance on how a central bank can respond, through the 
nominal interest rate, to changes in inflation or other economic conditions on American monetary 
policy); Paul Krugman, Op–Ed, Give Jobs A Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/opinion/krugman-give-jobs-a-change.html (focusing many of his 
articles on the actions of the Fed and debating their merits); Lawrence Summers, Op–Ed, Economic 
Stagnation Is Not Our Fate—Unless We Let it Be, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lawrence-summers-stagflation-is-not-our-fate--unless-we-let-
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But legal scholars have been less entranced by the committee—put off, 
perhaps, by the fact that the institution has never been checked by the courts or 
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4 As a result, there has been no 
effort to come to grips with the administrative law of the FOMC; this article 
seeks to redress that gap. 
The FOMC enjoys a legal mandate that shields its discretion to a 
remarkable degree. The principal claim here is that this shield, combined with 
the imperatives of bureaucratic organization in an institution whose raison 
d’etre is stability, has turned the FOMC into an agency governed by internally 
developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed constraints. The makeup of 
the committee, the materials that it consults before rendering monetary policy 
decisions, its voting mechanisms, and the way its decisions are promulgated are 
products of a mélange of evolving tradition and statutory permissiveness. 
One might argue that some combination of law and tradition explains what 
happens in most agencies. But the degree of reliance on tradition sets the 
FOMC apart. No one worries about the customs governing evidence 
presentation and voting order on multimember boards like the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
but they are subjects of scrutiny at the FOMC. By the same token, APA law, 
rather than traditions such as that of the FOMC’s so-called “beige book,” 
governs what goes into the record before, say, the EPA or Commerce 
Department make their factual findings.5 And Supreme Court decisions like 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. mean that the decisions rendered by most agencies are substantially 
lengthier, and strive for substantially less ambiguity, than those of the FOMC.6 
It is possible that this sort of development of routinized custom might be 
expected for agencies with few legal constraints. If so, the FOMC is a fine 
example of an institutional tendency, one that might have particular application 
in other forms of financial regulation. A mix of tradition and legal constraint 
are a feature of administrative constraint in that field, where litigation providing 
definitive opinions on required process is rare, and informal—and often 
nontransparent—oversight a norm. An account of the FOMC that jibes with the 
way this sort of regulation works might serve as a prod or a comparator for 
 
it-be/2013/12/15/55a1b84e-65c1-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html (outlining the role of monetary 
policy in avoiding a permanent depression).  
 4.  The agency that houses the FOMC has suffered from a similar neglect, even though, as 
Colleen Baker has observed, the Federal Reserve Board has “legal aspects [that] are highly significant 
and merit careful analysis by legal scholarship.” Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69, 71 (2012). 
 5.  See David Fettig, The Federal Reserve’s Beige Book: A Better Mirror than Crystal Ball, THE 
REGION, (Mar. 1, 1999), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3568 
(stating that the Beige Book is “just one piece of information used in the making of monetary policy” 
by the FOMC).  
 6.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 (1983). The 
FOMC, of course, also must in theory adhere to rationality review—it is, however, rarely required to do 
so.  
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other accounts of the administrative law of financial oversight. 
Given this theme, the article makes the following additional points: 
1. The FOMC enjoys the sorts of broad delegations that other New 
Deal agencies benefit from, only more so; the orders issued by the 
committee at the conclusion of each of its eight annual meetings do 
not fit within the traditional paradigms of administrative rulemaking 
or adjudication, leading courts to eschew any effort to review those 
decisions as committed to the agency’s discretion.7 
2. Given its free hand, the FOMC might be expected to be an empire 
builder. But in reality, it has only expanded its remit with regard to 
the sort of transactions it takes on, which have moved beyond the 
purchase and sale of federal government debt to include positions in 
a broader range of financial assets, as the financial crisis exemplified. 
3. The modest problems that the FOMC has endured at the hands of 
the branches that monitor independent agencies like it—the courts 
and Congress—have reflected its extraordinary independence and 
relative opacity. The courts have turned away a series of plaintiffs, 
including two senators, concerned about the breath of the delegation 
of power over the economy to the committee and the mechanism of 
appointment of committee members. Congress has occasionally 
fretted about the black box within which the committee makes its 
economy-changing decisions. However, in 1990, Congress removed 
legislation passed in the 1970s designed to require more reporting 
from the committee, suggesting that it, too, is cowed by the idea of 
subjecting the agency to much legislative oversight.8 
4. The committee makes decisions in a procedurally consistent but 
increasingly lengthy and elaborate way. Simple correlations between 
the transcripts of these meetings (length, size, mood, number of 
times the chair spoke), the ultimate decision made by the FOMC, 
and a number of leading economic indicators found one intriguing 
relationship between attendance and the direction of the federal 
funds rate.9 There may be some promising research directions 
available for this sort of analysis. 
If the above observations are meant to make a descriptive case about the 
way the FOMC makes decisions, the question arises whether we should regret 
its distance from traditional sorts of administrative procedure. The FOMC’s 
procedural uniqueness is a function of its independence; that independence is 
 
 7.  Though probably, if they must belong somewhere in the APA, they belong to informal 
adjudications, which amount to any order issued by an agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012) (“‘order’ 
means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or 
declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but including licensing”). The 
FOMC’s monetary policy rules amount to guidance to its open market trading desks as to what sort of 
federal funds rate they should target. 
 8.  See infra note 127.  
 9.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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justly celebrated. We can live with the irregularities and experiments offered by 
the idiosyncratic procedures of financial regulation in general, and with the 
FOMC in particular, though comfort with the independence of the committee 
does not excuse unfamiliarity with the way it operates. 
It is accordingly worth determining how the FOMC does its business, and no 
scholar has yet done so. This lack of coverage by legal scholars of the rules and 
culture surrounding open market operations is not, to be sure, a terrible 
dereliction of duty. Administrative lawyers often assume that the subjects they 
study closely—rulemaking and adjudication by agencies—are quite different 
from other services provided by the government, including block grants, the 
management of state-owned enterprises, and, indeed, the oversight of interest 
rates. These lawyers do not necessarily claim that administrative scholarship 
should cover the entire waterfront of government action. Moreover, from a 
disciplinary perspective, although lawyers are very much engaged in financial 
supervision—that is, the way that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) regulates 
banks—they have little to do with either the decisionmaking by the FOMC, 
which expands or shrinks the nation’s monetary supply, or the implementation 
of its open market orders, which is done by the traders who staff the New York 
Fed’s open market operations desk. 
Although these are all good reasons not to place the scrutiny of the 
government’s open market operations agency at the top of every scholar’s 
agenda, they do not justify ignorance of the committee. Any lawyer interested 
in institutional design ought to be interested in the design of one of the 
government’s signature institutions; by the same token, knowing how law 
constrains the least rule-bound or adjudicatory of agencies essays an outline of 
the reach of these legal constraints. 
In part III of this article, the legal constraints of the FOMC are considered 
in the classical administrative law vein. As this article discusses, those 
constraints have not limited the discretion of the FOMC, which enjoys a 
remarkable degree of independence from Congress, the executive, and the 
judiciary. Nonetheless, the limitations on the freedom of committee members to 
do as they wish are reviewed to give the reader a comprehensive sense of how 
the law, as expressed by the actual practice of the courts and Congress, have 
constrained the agency. But the analysis of how the FOMC operates begins in 
part II, where the way that the constraints that do exist have affected the 
agency’s decisionmaking process is considered. A brief conclusion ends the 
analysis. 
II 
FOMC DECISIONMAKING DURING THE GREENSPAN ERA 
This article posits that consistently observed custom comprises an important 
part of the governance offered by the FOMC, as the law offers little constraint 
on the agency. In part III, that law is reviewed. In this part of the article, some 
important consistencies that can be observed in FOMC decisionmaking are 
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discussed, illustrating the traditions that the Fed observes. 
Indeed, FOMC traditions affect the committee’s work product. There is 
some evidence that establishing customs mattered to one former Fed Chair: 
Alan Greenspan. During his tenure, movement in the federal funds rate was 
correlated in a statistically significant way with the ways its meetings were 
conducted. 
The FOMC’s work product is entirely encapsulated in its short missives 
issued at the conclusion of its deliberations; the agency is almost nothing more 
than its eight annual meetings. Those missives include a very brief statement 
about the federal funds rate that will be pursued in the period leading to the 
next meeting. 
Otherwise, except for occasional emergency telephonic meetings, FOMC 
members do not meet, and although Fed staffers prepare reports to the 
committee on the state of the economy in the interim, the committee does not 
operate its own research staff. No enforcement arm of the committee pursues 
cases against primary dealers who fail to target the interest rate sought by the 
agency, and so on. Instead, a trading desk in the New York Fed tries to meet 
the FOMC’s targets, and its actions are almost the sum total of the 
aftereffects—at least those involving bureaucratic action—of an FOMC 
meeting.10 Indeed, because all of the members of the FOMC hold other 
positions in the Fed and its regional reserve banks, the committee can be 
thought of as an agency that essentially only operates during its eight meetings 
per year, with the goal of producing a directive for the trading desk in New 
York. 
Understanding the process adopted at the meetings is accordingly critical to 
understanding the process of the FOMC. But, until recently, such an analysis 
was difficult to do. For much of the committee’s existence, what happened in 
FOMC meetings was kept secret. Congress only discovered that the agency was 
making meeting transcripts in the mid-1990s, and when it did, it evinced an 
exceeding interest in publicizing them.11 The FOMC protested, but ultimately 
agreed to release the transcripts, provided that a five-year delay on their 
publication would be observed.12 The quantitative component of this study lies 
in the relatively recent availability of transcripts of Fed meetings during the 
Greenspan era, which few realized were recorded. 
The qualitative component of the analysis lies in the availability of first-
hand sources on how the Greenspan Fed conducted its business, including an 
autobiography by Alan Greenspan,13 and a first-draft-of-history-style account of 
 
 10.  Of course, much of the effect of the announcement at the conclusion of the FOMC meeting is 
not realized by the trading activities of the New York Fed but by the reaction of the private sector to 
the FOMC’s announced target. 
 11.  See ROBERT D. AUERBACH, DECEPTION AND ABUSE AT THE FED; HENRY B. GONZALEZ 
BATTLES ALAN GREENSPAN'S BANK 87 (2008). 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  See generally ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW 
WORLD (2007).  
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his era by Bob Woodward.14 
A. Qualitative 
During the Greenspan era, FOMC meetings acquired a predictable sense of 
order. It adhered to traditions of consensus, it considered the same sort of 
evidence to make its decisions, and that evidence was produced in the same 
way. Its meeting agendas rarely varied, and the minimal guidance issued at the 
conclusion of each session also followed predictable tropes, even if the content 
of the guidance varied with the state of the economy. These outcomes were 
produced through a relatively standardized set of inputs. 
Meetings roughly started with a report, then a discussion, and then a 
conclusion by each member on the state of the economy, which was followed by 
a report, then a discussion, and then a recommendation by each member on 
what the Board of Governors (the Board) should do with the federal funds 
rate.15 The report—a staff report on the country’s economic conditions—
preceded a discussion by the committee about that subject. Ultimately, the 
members of the committee, in seriatim, would present their own assessments of 
the economy; regional bank presidents reported on their region, whereas Board 
members evaluated the national economy as a whole. 
The staff would then present a report on policy options, followed by a 
debate over which policy each member of the committee preferred. Greenspan 
would speak first in the policy debates and generally offered a proposal at that 
time.16 After the debate, Greenspan would propose a final policy, including a 
target funds rate. That policy would be subject to a formal vote. Almost 
overwhelmingly during the Greenspan era, those votes were unanimous. Only 
seven percent of all votes cast during his tenure were dissents.17 
In none of these meetings did the FOMC discuss what the larger purpose of 
its mission or approach to economic regulation ought to be—that is, to what 
end interest-rate manipulation ought to serve, and generally, whether pursuing 
it was good or bad at achieving particular goals, which surprised then–Board 
member and current Fed Chair Janet Yellen.18 Woodward concluded that “the 
flexibility and lack of clearly stated goals gave the FOMC, and Greenspan in 
 
 14.  See generally BOB WOODWARD, MAESTRO: ALAN GREENSPAN AND THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY (2012). 
 15.  Ellen W. Meade, The FOMC: Preferences, Voting and Consensus, 87 FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
ST. LOUIS REV. 1, 93–94, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/05/03/part1/ 
Meade.pdf. This organization has persisted to this day. See The Federal Open Market Committee, THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri2.htm (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 16.  See HENRY W. CHAPPELL, JR. ET AL., COMMITTEE DECISIONS ON MONETARY POLICY: 
EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE 121 (2005) 
(“Greenspan usually spoke first and offered a policy proposal in the policy go-around.”).  
 17.  Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, The Role of The Bias in 
Crafting Consensus: FOMC Decision Making in the Greenspan Era, 40 INT’L J. OF CENT. BANKING 39, 
42 (2007), available at http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q2a2.pdf. 
 18.  WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 170.  
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particular, much more maneuvering room.”19 
At the conclusion of the meeting, once the target rate and policy 
preferences had been voted upon, the committee would issue operating 
instructions—known as a “directive”—to the open market trading desk at the 
Federal Reserve Bank in New York. During most of Greenspan’s tenure, these 
instructions included a statement about the committee’s expectations for future 
changes in the federal fund rates.20 The statement on future policy came to be 
known as the “bias” of the policy directive.21 That bias would be “symmetric” if 
it indicated that a tightening or an easing of monetary policy would be equally 
likely.22 It would be “tilted” if it suggested that monetary policy was more likely 
to change in the future in one direction or another.23 
Of course, the meeting itself was not the only opportunity for FOMC 
members to interact. Greenspan discussed upcoming meetings with the other 
members of the Board—a practice he called “bilateral schmoozing.”24 In these 
one-on-one interactions, Greenspan could be quite persuasive. In the larger 
culture, Greenspan had a reputation for solemnity, fueled in part by his 
famously Delphic pronouncements before Congress of the state of the 
economy. But those who knew him praised the chairman for his sense of humor 
and force of personality.25 
Greenspan’s persuasive skills and apparently winning personality 
contributed in part to his ability to achieve consensus. Former Fed Vice 
Chairman Manuel Johnson said that during Greenspan’s tenure, “Alan rule[d] 
the room . . . . Until he ma[de] a big mistake he’[d] continue to get everything 
he want[ed].”26 Recently, Peter Conti-Brown and Simon Johnson have 
described the FOMC as one dominated by its chair, an observation few would 
contest for the Greenspan years.27 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Meade, supra note 15, at 95. See also Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Federal 
Reserve: Looking Back, Looking Forward (Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20140103a.htm (“The practice of issuing a statement after each meeting of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began under Chairman Greenspan.”). 
 21.  Daniel L. Thornton & David C. Wheelock, A History of Asymmetric Policy Directive, 82 FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 1, 1 (2000), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/ 
review/00/09/0009dt.pdf. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 32. 
 25.  JEROME TUCCILLE, ALAN SHRUGGED: ALAN GREENSPAN, THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL 
BANKER xv, 53, 66 (2002). 
 26.  Id. at 237. 
 27.  See generally Makram El-Shagi & Alexander Jung, Does the Greenspan Era Provide Evidence 
on Leadership in the FOMC? 6–8 (European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 1579, 2013) 
(noting the abundance of academic literature discussing the dominance of the chairman in the FOMC 
and likewise concluding that, “[c]learly, the Fed’s decision-making process is characterised by 
captainship”); Peter Conti-Brown & Simon Johnson, Governing the Federal Reserve System after the 
Dodd-Frank Act 8 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. Working Paper No. 2013-25, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376915.  
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In these pre- and postmeeting sessions, Greenspan evinced particular 
interest in unanimity on FOMC directives. He preferred that “the Fed speak 
with a single voice, even if no one was totally comfortable with the final 
decision,” even if the question was difficult and the economy was in dire shape.28 
According to Woodward, “Greenspan went into FOMC meetings with a bunch 
of votes stuffed in his pocket.”29 On occasion, Greenspan urged his fellow 
FOMC members to coalesce around a particular policy recommendation, 
arguing that “it would be very tragic if a group of this extraordinary 
capability . . . were perceived to be in disarray,” making it “crucially important 
that we stand tall as a group and try to find the means by which we can merge 
our differences.”30 
Greenspan was disinclined to worry overly about transparency. The decision 
to turn the reports on the economy from the country’s regional banks into the 
more organized Beige Book, to be publicized two weeks before FOMC 
meetings, preceded his time as Chair.31 His testimony to Congress was famously 
opaque.32 And the Fed Chair who succeeded him vowed to increase the 
transparency of the FOMC.33 
He also played an important role in making the agendas of the meetings so 
routinized and thereby narrowed the focus of the committee to the questions of 
the economic health of the country and the change in the money supply that the 
central bank could make to maintain that health. His organization of the FOMC 
schedule persists to this day, rendering the customs created during the 
Greenspan era durable and influential. 
Those customs of consensus where possible, ordered decisionmaking made 
pursuant to a rarely-deviated-from meeting template in most cases, a template 
that typically ended with terse public announcements about the decisions made, 
became the touchstones that market participants could count on from the 
committee. 
 
 28.  WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 49.  
 29.  Id. at 186.  
 30.  Id. at 107. 
 31.  Madeline Zavodny & Donna Ginter, Does the Beige Book Move Financial Markets? 72 
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 138, 140 (2005) (“The Beige Book is a survey of regional economic conditions 
publicly released about two weeks prior to each FOMC meeting since mid-1983.”). 
 32.  As Greenspan himself observed, the opacity was intentional. Devin Leonard & Peter Coy, 
Alan Greenspan on His Fed Legacy and the Economy, BLOOMBERG BUS., Aug. 9, 2012,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-08-09/alan-greenspan-on-his-fed-legacy-and-the-
economy#p2 (“[Y]ou construct what we used to call Fed-speak. I would hypothetically think of a little 
plate in front of my eyes, which was the Washington Post, the following morning’s headline, and I 
would catch myself in the middle of a sentence. Then, instead of just stopping, I would continue on 
resolving the sentence in some obscure way which made it incomprehensible.”). 
 33.  Bernanke, supra note 20 (observing that “[f]ostering transparency and accountability at the 
Federal Reserve was one of my principal objectives when I became Chairman in February 2006,” and 
describing his initiatives to do so in the FOMC specifically). 
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B. Quantitative 
One way to evaluate the effect of the increasingly customary procedure of 
the FOMC is to see whether variance in that process is associated with variance 
in the Fed’s policy outcomes. By mining the transcripts of FOMC meetings 
during the Greenspan era, a preliminary effort along these lines could be 
pursued. 
1. Introduction 
A literary analysis of all of the thousands of pages recorded during 
Greenspan’s lengthy tenure at the head of the committee is beyond the scope of 
this article; a quantitative analysis of those transcripts can, in its own way, be 
suggestive. Accordingly, the transcripts for the meetings between, and inclusive 
of, December 16, 1987, and January 31, 2006, were collected from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s FOMC history database.34 There was little missing data; some 
early meetings, held via telephonic conference call, were not transcribed.35 Of 
the 223 individual meeting days (FOMC meetings are two days long, in most 
cases, but sometimes are concluded in one), nine meeting days—all in 1987—
did not feature such transcripts.36 The list of individuals who served on the 
FOMC at least once was obtained from two sources: the Board of Governors 
membership list and the first FOMC minutes of each year, which lists the five 
Fed presidents who had executed their oaths of office joining the committee.37 
The list of attendees at each meeting, which includes not just FOMC members, 
but nonvoting regional bank presidents and Fed staffers, appears at the 
beginning of each transcript of the meeting. 
From the transcripts, basic data was collected related to the number of 
attendees at any FOMC meeting, the length of the transcript of any such 
meeting, and the existence of dissents from the order issued at the conclusion of 
the meeting, if any. In addition, the advanced search function of Adobe Reader 
permitted a search for terms. Most transcripts, for example, recorded 
“[LAUGHTER]”, making it possible to search for the number of occasions 
such hilarity ensued in any meeting, which in turn could serve as a proxy for the 
mood in the committee. For that reason, the number of laughs recorded in each 
FOMC meeting transcript was also collected. In the same way, the 
contributions, on a purely numerical level, of any particular FOMC member 
could also be searched by, for example, searching for “GREENSPAN.” 
Because the transcripts were recorded in a uniform format, with text and 
spacing the same size throughout the period, the total number of pages in a 
 
 34.  Federal Open Market Committee—Transcripts and Other Historical Materials, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ 
fomc_historical.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  See, e.g., Federal Open Market Committee—Conference Call of the Federal Open Market 
Committee, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Jan. 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080109confcall.pdf. 
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transcript served as evidence of the length of the deliberations in any particular 
meeting. 
Because the contributions and the attendance of any member of the 
committee could be tracked, this article assembled data doing so, even though it 
added to the scope of the project. Many of the members, if they were relatively 
long-serving regional bank presidents, rotated on and off the FOMC with some 
regularity. If they were members of the Board of Governors, they served for 
small portions of the approximately twenty years during which Greenspan 
chaired the Fed. Or, if they were staffers, they appeared at occasional, but not 
regular, meetings. 
Data from macroeconomic variables between August 18, 1987 and January 
31, 2006 were collected from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
database maintained by the St. Louis Fed.38 Macroeconomic data was collected 
on the Case-Shiller home price index, the federal funds rate, the country 
average home mortgage rate, real GDP in billions of chained 2005 dollars, the 
S&P 500 Index, and the unemployment rate. FRED data series were available 
in varying time interval formats. The format that provided dates that most 
closely matched the FOMC meeting date were selected for inclusion because 
that format most accurately reflected the macroeconomic environments on the 
date of the meeting. 
Accordingly, for each meeting, 181 variables were kept, most of which 
accounted for the attendance of any particular member of the FOMC or staff 
member. The data form a panel structure, because data on these members were 
collected for the 214 meeting days for which transcripts were available during 
the Greenspan era. 
2. Results 
Descriptively alone, the transcripts reveal some interesting facts about 
evolution of open market committee decisionmaking. Meetings lengthened as 
the Greenspan era wore on. In the beginning, the transcripts would average 
around fifty pages in length. This lasted until the mid-1990s, but then, from 2001 
to 2006, the average was much closer to one hundred pages in length. 
Marginally more people began attending the meetings as well. The number 
of attendees was always quite large, including the voting members of the 
committee, the nonvoting presidents of the other regional central banks, and 
the large quantity of staffers at the Fed reporting to the committee. During the 
early years, the average number of attendees of the Greenspan era was less than 
fifty, but after the halfway point in his regime, the average nosed above that 
mark. 
Moreover, for what it is worth, meetings got more amusing as the Chairman 
aged. This might indicate a lightening of the mood in those meetings, although 
the FOMC certainly went through turbulent times during both the beginning 
 
 38.  Federal Reserve Economic Data, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
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and the end of Greenspan’s tenure. FOMC transcribers recorded laughter on a 
per-transcript-page basis increasing from an average of less than twenty percent 
between 1988 and 1992 to over twenty percent in between 2001 and 2006.39 The 
higher the attendance at a meeting, the more laughter was recorded as well. 
Finally, a regression analysis including relevant macroeconomic variables 
and the various meeting-specific variables was conducted to see if any 
characteristics of the meetings reflected some statistically significant 
relationship with the broader economic decisions that the FOMC was trying to 
make. The most intriguing relationship—although a multivariate regression 
hardly establishes causation (there are no instruments or discontinuities 
exploited in the analysis) and the relationship was modest—was the statistically 
significant relationship between the number of attendees at the meeting and the 
change in the federal funds rate, holding time and other factors constant. 
The federal funds rate is the rate that the FOMC specifically targets, and is, 
at least in theory, the rate over which the committee has the most control. As 
figure 1 demonstrates, the rate varied over the era of Greenspan’s tenure 
depending on the state of the economy, inflation, growth, and the like. 
Conventional FOMC policy would be to reduce the federal funds rate to 
encourage borrowing during recessions, and to increase it when the economy 
grew, threatening inflation.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39.  Some of these changes, of course, are artifacts of better or at least different transcription 
paradigms. Some meetings between 1988 and 1992 were not recorded. Transcription mores may change 
over time as well, perhaps with laughter being part of a responsible transcriber’s remit in the twenty-
first century, while being superfluous to the art in the early 1980s. 
 40.  As the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has explained: 
To keep inflation in check, the Fed can use its monetary policy tools to raise the federal funds 
rate. Monetary policy in this case is said to be “tight” or “contractionary.” To fight recessions, 
the Fed can use its monetary policy tools to lower the federal funds rate. Monetary policy is 
then said to be “easy,” “expansionary,” or “accommodative.”  
What is the Fed: Monetary Policy, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/education/ 
teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/monetary-policy (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As figure 2 demonstrates, attendance at the meetings exhibited a broadly 
upward trend; the two trends do not seem at first glance to be particularly 
synchronized, but, conditioned on time, a small but statistically significant 
relationship at the five-percent level did exist. Figure 3 shows the histogram of 
the number of attendees over all the meetings in the sample; the mean number 
of attendees was 48.7 with a standard deviation of 9.3. 
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 Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it turned out, each additional attendee at an FOMC meeting is 
associated with a 0.02 increase in the federal funds rate. One way to state the 
relationship would be to say that for every increase of two basis points in the 
rate, an additional attendee at the meeting would be expected. (“Basis points” 
is the term used in the financial sector for hundredths of a percent.) To give the 
relationship context, the FOMC tends to target increases and decreases in the 
federal funds rate in increments of twenty-five basis points, and very rarely 
increases or decreases the rate by more than fifty basis points, that is, half of a 
percent.41 
To be more precise, the mean of the federal funds rate is 5.02%, with a 
standard deviation of 2.2 (which means that 68% of the time during the course 
of the study, the federal funds rate would be between 2.82% and 7.22%). The 
mean number of attendees is 48.7, with a standard deviation of 9.3. Since each 
attendee is associated with a 0.02 increase in the federal funds rate, a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of attendees—that is, if 58 people 
attended an FOMC meeting, rather than 49—was associated with a 9*.02 = 0.18 
increase in the federal funds rate, which is about 8% of the standard deviation 
 
 41.  See Open Market Operations Archive, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 
(2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket_archive.htm (tracking 
the history of changes in the federal funds rate targeted by the FOMC at the conclusion of its 
meetings).  
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in that variable (0.18/2.2 = 0.08). In other words, 8% of the ordinary variance in 
the rate could be associated with substantially increased attendance at the 
meeting. 
A table setting forth some simple models regressing the funds rates against 
time trends, a proxy for the mood of the meeting, the length of the meeting, and 
its size are set forth in the appendix to this article.42 A table suggesting some 
intriguing correlations between each of the variables is also set forth; these 
correlations did not survive the regression analysis, but are nonetheless 
interesting. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It would be premature to make much of the relationship, given that the 
effect is modest and the number of variables included in the regression is few. 
But positive correlations, and statistically significant relationships, are not to be 
ignored, and there is some reason to think that the link between rate increases 
and meeting attendance is not spurious. Perhaps, during the Greenspan era, the 
FOMC was marginally more likely to bring additional staffers to its meetings 
when it was thinking about increasing the interest rate, which had risky 
consequences for both growth and unemployment. Possibly, more observers, 
and indeed more committee members, made efforts to attend meetings when a 
 
 42.  See Appendix.  
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rate raise was at risk. It is difficult to speculate as to precisely why the effect is 
seen but it is nonetheless worth noting. The effect—despite being small—does 
emerge as statistically significant in the multivariate regression. 
The real hope is that the regression analysis provokes interest in further 
research along these lines. The claim here is not that a very important predictor 
of FOMC interest rate decisions has been found, but that a close study of the 
transcripts of FOMC meetings might have quantitative as well as qualitative 
insights worth revealing, and that collecting data towards that effort is 
uncomplicated. 
III 
THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE FOMC 
This part of the article offers a traditional analysis of the law governing the 
FOMC. It covers the authorizing statutes, court decisions, and the small amount 
of legal scholarship directed towards the committee.43 The FOMC enjoys a 
broad open market operations remit, though not one bereft of legislative 
instruction. Its authorizing statutes and location within the Fed give it a strong 
degree of structural insulation. That isolation has survived legal challenges, 
including challenges filed by congressional plaintiffs. The result is that neither 
the law of the committee, nor supervision by the President, Congress, or the 
courts, have provided the sort of constraints over what the FOMC does that 
other agencies ordinarily face. 
A. The FOMC’s Powers and Independence 
1. Statutory Authority 
The Supreme Court has said that the Fed’s “[o]pen market operations—the 
purchase and sale of Government securities in the domestic securities market—
are the most important monetary policy instrument of the Federal Reserve 
System.”44 The power to target a particular federal funds rate was given to the 
Fed by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.45 That statute granted the various 
reserve banks the power to “establish . . . rates of discount to be charged by the 
 
 43.  For some context, Henry Hu has described the Federal Reserve and the FOMC as biased, if 
well-meaning, stabilizers of investor expectations, in a way that incentivizes them—somewhat 
ironically—to take more risks. See Henry Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government 
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2000). On this understanding, the Fed’s role in ensuring economic 
stability is regularly undermined by its contribution to moral hazard in finance. Under Allan Meltzer’s 
political economic model of the Fed, any interpretation of the policymaker’s decisions would be 
incomplete without accounting for the relevant political pressures, and even some influence from the 
academy. See generally 1 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2003); 2 
ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2009); Allan H. Meltzer, Politics and 
the Fed (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Carnegie Mellon University), available at 
https://student–3k.tepper.cmu.edu/GSIADOC/WP/2010–E30.pdf. As such, policy success is predicated 
on a delicate balance of political pressures and a correct understanding of economics, which, in his 
view, means one receptive to monetarism and the economic theories of Milton Friedman.  
 44.  Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 343 (1979). 
 45.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2012).  
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Federal Reserve Bank for each class of paper” that it was authorized to sell.46 
The modern Fed and the FOMC were created in the Great Depression to 
coordinate the setting of these discount rates. The FOMC was given the power 
to engage in “open market operations,” as well as to direct the terms of those 
operations in all of the Federal Reserve banks.47 “Open market operations” is a 
term that Congress has not defined with precision, though it has identified a 
laundry list of permissible transactions that fall within the term’s rubric.48 
The FOMC has accordingly interpreted its mandate broadly. The Fed has 
said that the Congress meant to allocate to the FOMC the power to make any 
“purchase and sale of securities in the open market by a central bank,” and, 
because the term “securities” covers myriad financial instruments, the FOMC 
has exercised its authority to buy and sell American sovereign debt,49 foreign 
currencies,50 and, during the financial crisis, even take positions in troubled real 
estate assets.51 
Congress has directed the FOMC to use its open market powers to facilitate 
three goals; it “shall maintain long-run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase 
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”52 Moreover, with regard 
to the timing and scale of transactions, it has directed that “open-market 
operations shall be governed with a view to accommodating commerce and 
business and with regard to their bearing upon the general credit situation of 
the country.”53 
2. Structural Independence 
The FOMC’s structural insulation has given it a great deal of discretion in 
deciding how to implement this real guidance (indeed, the agency arguably has 
 
 46.  12 U.S.C. § 357 (2012).  
 47.  See generally 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2012).  
 48.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 348a, 353 (2012) (identifying powers of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System). For an overview, see generally What is the Fed?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, http://www.frbsf.org/education/teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed (last visited Apr. 
3, 2015). 
 49.  See Credit Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_openmarketops.htm (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015) (describing how the Fed uses open market operations to take positions in, among other 
things, “Treasury securities, agency securities, and agency MBS”). 
 50.  See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 
603, 628 (2013) (“The FOMC . . . has traditionally had authority for swap line operations. The Federal 
Reserve Board has traditionally had authority over the opening and the maintenance of accounts with 
foreign banks based upon the language of section 14(e).”).  
 51.  For example, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) and the public–
private partnership during the financial crisis. For a discussion, see generally Peter K. Mckee, Jr., 
Checking in on TALF and PPIP: What Are Their Effects of CMBS Markets, ANDREWS KURTH BLOG 
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.andrewskurth.com/assets/pdf/blogpost_Checking-in-on-TALF-and-PPIP.pdf.  
 52.  12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012). 
 53.  12 U.S.C. § 263(c) (2012). 
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been given more direction by Congress than have other New Deal agencies told 
to, for example, regulate in the “public interest” or to define “unfair labor 
practices”54). The Fed—the FOMC’s home—is probably the most independent 
of the government’s agencies, and part of its independence lies in its legal 
design. It has been structured in a way that minimizes executive influence in a 
manner typical of independent agencies, which are agencies headed by officials 
less accountable to the President than executive branch agencies are. The Fed 
and the FOMC also enjoy strong freedom from legislative oversight enforced 
through a tightening or loosening on its purse strings. And the courts almost 
never get in the agency’s way. Out of this striking independence, a culture of 
noninterference has grown. 
The Fed, like the other so-called “independent” government agencies, exists 
outside of the executive branch.55 Like other heads of independent agencies, 
Board members are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.56 
Unlike the heads of cabinet departments, the members of the Fed’s Board of 
Governors, who are also the members of the FOMC, cannot be removed from 
their posts by the President except for cause.57 
Moreover, the President enjoys much less control over the Fed and FOMC 
once they are staffed than he does over executive branch agencies. The FOMC 
does not submit a regulatory agenda, or its decisions on monetary policy, for 
review by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, as executive 
branch agencies must with their agendas and important regulatory rules.58 
Congressional oversight, often thought to be a feature of independent 
agencies, is even weaker. Unlike those agencies, the Fed does not depend upon 
 
 54.  For a discussion of public interest standards, and comparison of them to the unfair labor 
practice standard applied by the National Labor Relations Board, see Richard A. Marks, Retaliatory 
Reporting of Illegal Alien Employees: Remedying the Labor-Immigration Conflict, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
1296, 1316 n.35 (1980) (discussing “a broad public interest standard such as those in the enabling 
statutes of many other regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, see 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2) (1976); the 
FCC, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310(d) (1976), and the ICC, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 5(2), 20a(2) 
(1976)”).  
 55.  See PAULINE SMALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20826, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1 (2010) (stating that the Federal Reserve is an independent entity in 
order to avoid political influence, and that the President only has power to appoint members to the 
Board of Governors). 
 56.  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, THE STRUCTURE OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 57.  12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). See also The Federal Open Market Committee, THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri2.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015) (specifying membership composition details). 
 58.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sep. 30. 1993) (outlining general regulatory 
practices executive agencies must participate in). But see Letter from Ben Bernanke to Cass R. 
Sunstein (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/regulatory-burden-
reduction-111115.pdf (noting that the Federal Reserve will keep the OMB informed of its efforts). The 
FOMC, by contrast, simply announces its federal funds rate decisions to the world shortly after it 
concludes one of its eight annual meetings. See, e.g., Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/ 
20120125c.htm (announcing FOMC’s “principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy 
strategy”).  
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Congress for a budget; it is self-funding, based on the fees it charges banks for 
supervision, and the profits it makes through its open market operations.59 The 
agencies do not ignore Congress; the Fed and FOMC do make senior officials 
available for testimony before both House and Senate committees.60 But that 
testimony is rarely as fireworks-filled as it is for other agency heads. Fed 
officials do not live in fear of the grilling that their counterparts in other 
agencies receive, as no budget sanction exists in the background, out of which a 
culture of noninterference has grown.61 
The result is that the relationship between Congress and the FOMC and Fed 
is much more attenuated than that between Congress and the SEC, an agency 
that does depend on an annual appropriation and accordingly spends a great 
deal of time on the cultivation of congressional committees. President Obama’s 
first SEC chair, Mary Schapiro, testified over forty-eight times before Congress 
during her five years in charge of the agency62 and by all accounts left 
“exhausted.”63 During that period, Ben Bernanke, the Fed and FOMC Chair, 
testified a similar forty-nine times, but on thirteen occasions the testimony was 
simply repeated before different committees; one never hears of Fed chairmen 
finding their interaction with legislators to be exhausting.64 
Congress could, of course, take a sterner approach to supervision of the Fed 
and the FOMC. It could eliminate its self-funding nature, and indeed, there are 
some politicians who wish to “end the Fed” and impose an auditing 
requirement on the institution.65 The institution, however, has successfully 
 
 59.  BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 11 (9th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/ 
pf_complete.pdf. 
 60.  See e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, FED. RESERVE, SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS, (July 17, 2013) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/ 
bernanke20130717a.htm (presenting the Fed’s semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress). 
Identical remarks were presented to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
the following day. 
 61.  For example, a recent testimony by Commissioner Fink of IRS’s Small Business and Self-
Employment Division was quite lively. Gregory Korte, Blasted by Congress, IRS Apologizes For Lavish 
Events, USA TODAY, June 6, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/irs-
conferences-oversight-hearing/2395337/. 
 62.  Schapiro’s hearing activity waxed and waned during that period; she testified 8 (2009); 10 
(2010); 18 (2011); 8 (2012); and 4 (2013) times, according to the agency’s publicly available records. See 
Testimony, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/News/Page/List/Page/1356125649559 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 63.  Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Rebuilding Wall St.’s Watchdog, DEALBOOK, Nov. 26, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/schapiro-head-of-s-e-c-to-announce-
departure/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. See also Joshua Gallu & Robert Schmidt, Schapiro SEC 
Reign Nears End with Rescue Mission Not Done, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 19, 2012, 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-19/schapiro-sec-reign-nears-end-with-rescue-mission-not-
done (“She has told friends that the late nights and almost constant policy battles have left her 
exhausted and eager to depart after the November election.”). 
 64.  These occasions were counted from the Federal Reserve database. 2009 Testimony of Federal 
Reserve Officials, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/testimony/2009testimony.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 65.  JohnPaul M. Callan, Reexamining the Federal Monetary Powers, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
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argued that its independence from politics is a necessary precondition for 
monetary stability, and, as this article examines, relative independence from 
political oversight is now thought to be a “best practice” of currency stability.66 
3. Judicial Review 
Moreover, the FOMC and the agency that houses it have an excellent 
record in the courts, meaning that the gentle oversight played by the two 
politically accountable branches is not paired with something more rigorous 
from the judiciary. Augustus Hand stated that he could not guess at what might 
be wrong with a legally constituted bank making loans to other banks and 
setting interest rates for those loans in Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, in one 
of the earliest efforts to challenge a Fed policy.67 Hand concluded that, 
It would be an unthinkable burden upon any banking system if its open market sales 
and discount rates were to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, the correction of 
discount rates by judicial decree seems almost grotesque, when we remember that 
conditions in the money market often change from hour to hour, and the disease 
would ordinarily be over long before a judicial diagnosis could be made.68 
No court has disagreed with Hand’s view of the institutional competences at 
play. Indeed, the Fed’s record in court is strong enough to suggest that a 
combination of Chevron deference, unwilling potential plaintiffs, and, most 
importantly, the lack of a standard for reviewability identified by Judge Hand in 
Raichle, has made the agency extremely difficult to judicially supervise.69 
The record is even stronger for the FOMC. Although the Fed’s supervisory 
rules do get reversed occasionally,70 the FOMC’s decisions have generally been 
exempted from judicial review entirely.71 None of the five cases reported in the 
 
111, 144 (2011) (describing these critics as the people behind “slogans such as “End the Fed,” or 
nationally supported “Audit the Fed” Bills”). 
 66.  See infra Part II.C. 
 67.  See Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1929). 
We can see no basis for the contention that it is a tort for a Federal Reserve Bank to sell its 
securities in the open market, to fix discount rates which are unreasonably high, or to refuse to 
discount eligible paper, even though its policy may be mistaken and its judgment bad. 
Id. See also Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat’l. Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(discussing in a case involving the supervisory powers of the Fed that, “it is not for the courts to say 
whether or not the actions taken were justified in the public interest, particularly where it vitally 
concerned the operation and stability of the nation's banking system”). 
 68.  Raichle, 34 F.2d at 915.  
 69.  Cf. David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187 (2010) (discussing the 
high degree of judicial deference granted to Treasury actions under similar conditions). 
 70.  Compare In Re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding the Fed exceeded its 
authority in enacting rule precluding discovery of bank examination information), and Sec. Indus. 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing the Fed’s 
decision to permit a bank to sell commercial paper), with Ass’n of Bank Travel Bureaus, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 568 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1978) (denying petition to review the Fed’s 
rule–making decision). 
 71.  None of the five cases that named the FOMC as a defendant were direct challenges to FOMC 
decisions and all were dismissed for lack of standing or merit. Two suits, brought by senators, 
challenged the appointment procedures of the committee as violating the Constitution. An earlier suit, 
filed in 1976, alleged FOMC violations of the Freedom of Information Act for failing to make certain 
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Federal Reporter or Supplement that name the FOMC as a defendant were 
direct challenges to FOMC open market orders, and all were dismissed for lack 
of standing or merit. Two suits, brought by legislators, challenged the 
appointment procedures of the committee as violating the Constitution.72 An 
earlier suit, filed in 1976, alleged FOMC violations of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) for failing to make certain records promptly 
available.73 Another suit was brought against both the Fed and the FOMC, 
challenging the constitutionality of the American monetary system.74 Although I 
analyze this litigation in more detail later in this article, as a first order of 
approximation, with the exception of the FOIA suit (which failed at the 
Supreme Court), it went nowhere. The judiciary is simply disengaged from the 
project of oversight of the committee. 
B. The Strange Case of FOMC Appointments 
If anything, the strongest legal limitations on the FOMC lie not in the 
calibration of its statutory mandate (which is generously broad) or its location 
in the federal government (where it is an independent part of a particularly 
independent agency) but in the constraints on the committee’s membership. 
The committee is comprised of the seven members of the Board of Governors 
of the Fed, along with five representatives from the thirteen Federal Reserve 
banks, one of which is, by law, the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York.75 
This committee structure has enabled regional dissent on open market 
policymaking matters and incorporates some relative outsiders into committee 
decisionmaking; it appears that the regional presidents are more likely to have 
diverse monetary policy views than are the members of the Board of 
Governors, although polarization on the FOMC is far from dramatic.76 It also, at 
least, in theory, makes for an FOMC with a voting membership larger than that 
of most agencies, which ought to be more difficult for a chair to dominate. 
The mechanisms of appointments to the FOMC have had cross-cutting 
effects over time. The history of the way appointments to the FOMC have been 
handled has bolstered the insulation, rather than the diversity, of the 
committee. For example, in the Banking Act of 1933 that created the FOMC, 
membership was doled out to the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
 
records promptly available. Another suit was brought against both the Fed and the FOMC, challenging 
the constitutionality of the American monetary system. 
 72.  Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986); Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. 
Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 73.  Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979). 
 74.  Howe v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1986). 
 75.  12 U.S.C. § 263 (2012). 
 76.  See John Sides, Democratic and Republican Appointees to the Federal Reserve Aren’t That 
Different, After All, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2013/11/15/democratic-and-republican-appointees-to-the-federal-reserve-arent-that-different-
after-all/ (stating that differences in political views of appointed Fed members are “modest at best”).  
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Comptroller of the Currency.77 That was changed in the Banking Act of 1935 
(the ‘35 Act), which removed the members of the executive branch from the 
committee and added the regional bank presidents.78 The ‘35 Act also increased 
the tenure of members of the Board of Governors to fourteen years, which is 
long by federal agency standards.79 In the Banking Act of 1942, the voting and 
membership structure of the committee as it exists today was established, giving 
members of the board a majority of the seats on the committee.80 
In other ways, the membership is chosen in a way perfectly consistent with 
the ordinary practice for federal administrative agencies. The Board of 
Governors component of the FOMC cannot have more than four members of 
the same party, and is meant to be drawn from “a fair representation of the 
financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests.”81 Presidents do not 
always honor every aspect of this cross-sectional suggestion, but there is a 
tradition of nominating one community (which is traditionally the word used to 
refer to “small” in the industry) banker to the Board of Governors.82 Nonvoting 
reserve bank presidents also attend the committee’s meetings, and can debate, 
but not vote.83 
But the reserve bank role on the FOMC makes the appointments question a 
particularly interesting one. Because the member banks of the Federal Reserve 
own their regional banks, their representation on the FOMC blurs the public 
and the private and is hardly characteristic of federal agencies. 
Accordingly, although the FOMC generally speaks with one voice, its 
rotating regional presidents are the likely sources of any dissent, as they do not 
 
 77.  Gary Richardson et al., Banking Act of 1935, FED. RESERVE HISTORY,  (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/26 (“The secretary of treasury, who had 
served as the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the comptroller of the currency, who had 
served as a member of the Federal Reserve Board, ceased to serve with the Federal Reserve after 
1936.”).  
 78.  For a discussion, see Bernard Shull, Financial Crisis Resolution and Federal Reserve 
Governance: Economic Thought and Political Realities (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard College Working 
Paper No. 784, 2014), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_784.pdf; see also Laurence H. 
Meyer, Governor of the Fed. Reserve Bd., The Politics of Monetary Policy: Balancing Independence 
and Accountability, Remarks at the University of Wisconsin (Oct. 24, 2000), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20001024.htm (describing independence of the 
Fed as being “especially important”). 
 79.  Peter Conti-Brown, The Structure of Federal Reserve Independence 36 (Rock Ctr. for 
Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 139, 2014) (“This is one of the longest 
terms of service in the federal government. Scholars have long discussed the Fed Governors’ lengthy 
tenure,” though Conti-Brown observes that, in practice, board members rarely serve out their full 
terms.). 
 80.  David Fettig, The Federal Reserve's Beige Book: A Better Mirror Than Crystal Ball, THE 
REGION: FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, March 1999, available at 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3568.  
 81.  12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012). 
 82.  See Conti-Brown & Johnson, supra note 27, at 8 (stating that there is usually one board 
member who is either a community banker or “has strong support among community bankers).  
 83.  FED. OPEN MKT. COMM. http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015) (“Nonvoting Reserve Bank presidents attend the meetings of the Committee, participate 
in the discussions, and contribute to the Committee's assessment of the economy and policy options.”). 
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necessarily come from the same cloth as do appointees to the Board of 
Governors. Some rise through the ranks of the reserve banks bureaucracy, 
whereas others enjoy long careers in either finance or other business before 
taking up the post of president. Members of the Board, on the other hand, are 
more likely to be highly credentialed economists, and more likely to come from 
academia or politics. In some ways, the regional presidents add some diversity 
of viewpoints to the FOMC; in other ways, they are sometimes thought to 
provide lower-quality advice to the chair.84 
But, given their outsider status and yet decidedly insider committee role, 
they, too, have prompted some rumblings about the legality of their role, 
rumblings that have a doctrinally compelling basis but that have enjoyed no 
success in the courts. The committee has been challenged for constituting a 
violation of the Appointments Clause; the idea is that the members of the 
committee are exercising substantial enough powers to constitute either 
principal or inferior officers of the United States and yet are not treated as such. 
Article II of the Constitution states that the President “shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States.”85 The Court in Morrison v. 
Olson announced a totality of the circumstances test for determining who is an 
“[o]fficer of the United States”—of either the principal or the inferior variety—
that involved, as Justice Scalia’s dissent characterized it, “[t]aking all things into 
account.”86 
That test is not exactly precise, but the case against the FOMC appointees is 
straightforward enough. Even if the regional bank presidents did not constitute 
principal officers—and everyone else on the FOMC does, in fact, go through 
the process of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation—the argument 
that they constitute at the very least inferior officers is strong. The FOMC 
directs important government action, is reversible by no one, and mostly 
consists of Senate-appointed Officers of the United States. Should five of its 
twelve members really be considered anything different? 
Inferior officers include district court clerks and special prosecutors; the 
argument that members of the committee tasked with combatting 
unemployment and inflation on a country-wide basis enjoy similar, or better, 
degrees of authority is straightforward.87 The appointment of inferior officers 
 
 84.  For a critique of regional bank president performance in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
see Mark Thoma, Refocusing the Fed?, MODEL BEHAVIOR, (May 3, 2011), 
http://modeledbehavior.com/2011/05/03/refocusing-the-fed/.  
 85.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 86.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).  
 87.  As the Heritage Foundation has observed: 
In Edmond v. United States (1997), the Court, while continuing to deny that it had recognized 
any definitive test, stated that "‘inferior Officers' are officers whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the 
advice and consent of the Senate." Among those officers recognized as "inferior" are district 
court clerks, federal supervisors of elections, the Watergate Special Prosecutor, and an 
Independent Counsel appointed under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 
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need not be subject to Senate confirmation, but the power to do so must be 
vested in the President, the Heads of Departments, or the Courts of Law.88 The 
regional Fed presidents, appointed by their semiprivate boards of bankers, 
probably do not meet that test.89 
Although this looks like a real problem, the courts have uniformly rejected 
challenges based on this critique, either on political question grounds or on 
unexplained grounds that seem to work the same way. For example, in Melcher 
v. FOMC, Senator John Melcher (D-MT) challenged the appointment of the 
five regional bank representatives on the FOMC under this exact reasoning. 
The court, without a substantial amount of explanation, concluded that “while 
the composition of the [FOMC] may be unusual, it is not unconstitutional.”90 
In Riegle v. FOMC, Senator Donald Riegle (D-MI) claimed that the 
election process was invalid because it deprived him, as a senator, of his 
“constitutional right to advise and consent regarding the appointment.”91 The 
D.C. Circuit exercised its “equitable discretion to dismiss the case on the 
ground that judicial action would improperly interfere with the legislative 
process.”92 
Recently, these appointments concerns have been given a boost by the logic 
of Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, where the Court held that “multilevel 
protection from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive 
power in the President.”93 This also poses a problem for institutions like the 
FOMC because some members are appointed by a combination of private 
parties and for cause appointees. Harold Krent has argued that “[t]he logic of 
Free Enterprise Fund strongly suggests that Congress may not, consistent with 
Article II, delegate significant authority to private and state entities [which] . . . 
imperils . . . the Federal Open Market.”94 
To be sure, there are some reasons to think that, functionally, the oddly 
appointed FOMC is constitutionally acceptable. Regional bank members of the 
committee know that they are accountable to someone—the boards of the 
 
See Douglas Cox, Inferior Offices, THE HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/ 
articles/2/essays/92/inferior-officers (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
 88.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 89.  See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72. The court in Morrison advanced a four-part test in 
scrutinizing the constitutionality of appointments that did not occur by the President followed by 
confirmation by the Senate: (1) whether the officer is removable by a higher Executive Branch official; 
(2) whether the officer’s duties are limited in scope; (3) whether the officer’s office is limited in 
jurisdiction; and (4) whether the officer’s office is limited in tenure. See generally id. It seems plausible, 
if not likely, that the Fed presidents would fail the first of these tests; they may not pass muster under 
the other factors either. 
 90.  Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 524 (D.D.C. 1986) aff'd, 836 F.2d 561 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 91.  Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). 
 94.  Harold Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2454 (2011).  
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regional Fed banks; and, moreover, member banks of the Fed desire a stable 
and strong economy just as much as the Board of Governors in Washington do 
and are likely to hope that the presidents of the regional reserve banks share 
those aims. Indeed, this alignment of basic interest between banks and their 
supervisors is a unique feature of banking regulation.95 
Second, or at least so Krent has argued, market discipline may goad partly 
privately accountable FOMC members to act in a public-spirited fashion 
because acting for purely private gain would be easily disclosed and therefore 
unlikely to be successful.96 Thus, even though the FOMC is “unaccountable in 
the usual sense for [its] acts,” the committee is “circumscribed by some external 
constraint.”97 
C. Implications of Independence 
The striking degree of independence enjoyed by the FOMC is often thought 
to be a “best practice” of central bank design.98 Central banks that are subject to 
the political process, it has been argued, often surrender to short-term thinking 
about the need for currency stability so that they adjust monetary policy to suit 
the needs of the party in power—often to the detriment of long-term stability to 
the money supply as well as the economy as a whole.99 
This tendency is why the World Bank has recommended to all of its client 
countries that they insulate their central banks from political oversight.100 The 
European Central Bank has been created with something approaching 
superindependence. During the European sovereign debt crisis, it has, often 
over political opposition, devised its own novel and active approach to 
defending the Euro; it can afford to essentially disregard the views of European 
 
 95.  See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 59, 107 (2013) (noting that “regulators are charged with ensuring safety and soundness of the 
system, and the managers and owners of banks have every interest in ensuring that their own 
institutions do not go bankrupt”); see also Harold Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive, 85 NW. 
U.L. REV. 62, 102 (also discussing the reasons why even semiprivately accountable officials might have 
the right sorts of incentives in the case of the FOMC). 
 96.  Krent, supra note 94, at 103 (“market discipline may ensure a measure of public-
regardedness”).  
 97.  Id. at 102. 
 98.  See Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and 
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 151, 154 
(1993) (insulated central banks are less likely to set inflationary monetary policy); Meyer, supra note 77 
(speech by member of the FOMC on the value of independent central banks); Geoffrey P. Miller, An 
Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998) (discussing the 
interest group effects on a nonindependent central bank). Cf. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 294 (2006) (discussing the best practices of agency rulemaking).  
 99.  See Timothy A. Canova, Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight: An Empirical 
Review of Central Bank Independence, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 237, 237 (“It was widely accepted that 
politicians could not be trusted with monetary policy because their short-term time horizons and 
fixations on their next elections.”). 
 100.  The World Bank strongly advocates for national political, fiscal, and administrative 
decentralization. See Decentralization & Subnational Regional Economics, THE WORLD BANK GROUP 
(2001), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/what.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
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political leaders over its appropriate role.101 
D. Nondelegation Agonists 
Nonetheless, the dramatic insulation of a particular agency from oversight 
from any of the three branches of government—or, indeed, the very existence 
of a central bank with responsibility for currency stability and economic 
growth—is not something obviously contemplated by the Constitution.102 
Because of what I would characterize as the “settled expectations” check on 
the logic of constitutional law, the FOMC is probably too old and too important 
to be vulnerable to life-threatening constitutional challenge.103 It has been 
accepted in almost all corners of the Washington establishment; the FOMC has 
been playing a surpassingly important monetary policy role since passage of the 
Banking Act of 1933. It is difficult to raise constitutional questions now about 
something that has been part of the furniture of government for so long.104 
Moreover, other longstanding traditions that the Supreme Court has called into 
constitutional question—the sentencing guidelines or the legislative veto, for 
example—had much shorter tenures, and were not the subject of active 
opposition by duly appointed officers of the United States, such as Article III 
judges, in the case of the former,105 and the Department of Justice, in the case of 
the latter.106 
That does not mean that the separation of powers problems posed by the 
FOMC are easy. The first constitutional question posed by a central bank is 
whether the Constitution permits the creation of such an institution. President 
 
 101.  See Independence, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/ 
independence/html/index.en.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (“Neither the ECB or the national central 
banks, nor any member of their decisionmaking bodies, are allowed to seek or take instruction from 
EU institutions or bodies, from any government of an EU member State or from any other body.”). 
 102.  The creation of the First Bank of the United States—not a central bank, but not entirely 
dissimilar—was vehemently opposed by Thomas Jefferson for this reason. See Growing Opposition, 
U.S. HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/us/18c.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 103.  This “doctrine” is entirely my invention and might be considered a precautionary principle for 
Supreme Court Justices. It helps to explain why the Court might find, for example, that prayer to open 
legislative sessions is not inconsistent with the First Amendment prohibition against the establishment 
of religion, or, as it said, “A test that would sweep away what has so long been settled would create new 
controversy and begin anew the very divisions along religious lines that the Establishment Clause seeks 
to prevent.” Town of Greece v. Galloway, 124 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014). See generally Serpentfoot v. 
Rome City Comm’n, 426 Fed. App’x. 884 (11th Cir. 2011). Or, it may help to explain why the Court 
might find that an agency with broad powers to regulate the accounting industry should not be 
disbanded despite being staffed in a manner inconsistent with the Appointments Clause. See generally 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,, 561 U.S. 477 (2009).  
 104.  See Bernstein, infra note 116, at 118–23 (outlining the history of the FOMC). 
 105.  See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial proscribes judges from imposing criminal sentences above statutorily fixed maximums if the 
sentence is based on factors other than those determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 106.  See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a section of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act permitting an Executive Branch decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the 
United States to be overruled by resolution of one house of Congress was unconstitutional because 
such action was legislative in nature). 
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Jefferson thought it did not; neither did President Jackson, who said, “if the 
bank be established for that purpose, with a charter unalterable without its 
consent, Congress have parted with their power for a term of years, during 
which the Constitution is a dead letter. It is neither necessary nor proper to 
transfer its legislative power to such a bank.”107 
M’Culloch v. Maryland settled that part of that old argument, doctrinally, at 
least, in favor of central banking. The second iteration of the Bank of the 
United States was deemed to be a permissible exercise of the power to regulate 
interstate commerce because the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
Constitution permitted Congress to go beyond the enumerated powers of the 
Constitution and create new institutions if doing so would contribute to its 
constitutional remit.108 
The second question posed is whether an institution with such broad powers 
and independence is consistent with our three-branch system of government. 
Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress is not allowed to entirely abdicate 
its responsibility for legislating in favor of some other institution.109 It must 
provide that institution with an “intelligible principle” to guide its use of the 
legislative power granted it by the legislature.110 The intelligible principle test 
has been famously easy to meet. The Supreme Court has only found two 
delegations of legislative authority to be unconstitutional—and both were in 
1935, two short terms before the “switch in time that saved nine” that marked a 
drastic shift in judicial receptivity to the administrative innovations of the New 
Deal state.111 A suit challenging the delegation to FOMC was brought in 1964—
Bryan v. Federal Open Market Committee—challenging the powers of the 
committee to be an “unwarranted delegation of power by Congress.”112 The suit 
was dismissed for lack of standing, as the plaintiff could not differentiate his 
injury from the existence of the institution from that of any other American 
 
 107.  Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS 576–89 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). See also H.W. BRANDS, THE MONEY MEN 
57–96 (2006) (describing the obstacles that faced the national bank). 
 108.  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 350 (1819). 
 109.  See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 
(1994) (using the example of Congress delegating all legislative responsibilities to a “Goodness and 
Niceness Commission” with direction that they act only in applying those standards). 
 110.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (Congress can seek assistance from other 
branches as long as it “lay[s] down by legislative an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized . . . is directed to conform.”). See generally Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the 
Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between The Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921 (2006) (discussing the consequences of “the nearly unbounded nondelegation 
doctrine”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317 (2000) (describing 
“how certain canons of construction operate as nondelegation principles”). 
 111.  See e.g. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (holding 
“that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power”); 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (finding that the challenged statute “goes 
beyond” the “limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend”).  
 112.  See Bryan v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 235 F. Supp. 877, 878, 882 (D. Mont. 1964) (“[I]f plaintiff 
could champion and litigate such a case, every other owner of government obligations affected by the 
operations of the Open Market Committee could do the same.”). 
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citizen – something that means that a nondelegation doctrine challenge would 
have to come from the primary deal banks themselves (who buy or sell 
Treasury debt from the open markets desk of the New York Fed, as directed by 
the FOMC), or perhaps their financial market competitors.113 These pools of 
plaintiffs might be able to show the requisite differential injury. Thus far, for 
whatever reason, no such suit appears to have ever been filed, possibly because 
primary dealers enjoy their role as the Fed’s counterparty, and their 
competitors prefer the policies of the FOMC to their alternative. 
However, the nondelegation doctrine has a corollary, of admittedly 
uncertain doctrinal provenance, that posits that legislative delegations to 
private parties are particularly disfavored—much more than congressional 
delegation to the executive branch or to an independent agency would be. In 
2013, the D.C. Circuit proclaimed—in Association of American Railroads v. 
United States Department of Transportation—that “federal lawmakers cannot 
delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.”114 The Fed’s regional banks 
are owned, at least in theory, by their members, who are private-sector financial 
intermediaries—meaning that some of the voters on the FOMC come from 
institutions that are privately held.115 The purported private antidelegation 
canon has been the most persistent source of worry about the 
superindependence of the FOMC in both the legal literature and in the 
doctrine.116 As perspicacious a constitutional thinker as John Hart Ely argued 
that the Fed and its monetary policy committee are “the poster child of an 
unconstitutional private delegation.”117 
But the Supreme Court has never indicated implacable hostility to private 
delegations, and, indeed, in the modern state, nongovernmental standard-
setters can and do play an important role in making agency policy on subjects 
 
 113.  Id. See also Howe v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1986) aff’d, 802 F.2d 440 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (dismissing suit against constitutionality of FOMC for lack of standing).  
 114.  See Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (For the 
federal government to “delegate regulatory authority to a private entity . . . would be ‘legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form.’” (quoting Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936))), 
rev’d on other grounds, Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) (finding 
Amtrak to be a government actor). Cf. Potter v. State, 509 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) 
(“[T]he general rule has become fixed that the legislature may not delegate legislative functions to 
private persons.”).  
 115.  Although, under the Dodd–Frank Act, the directors who pick those regional bank presidents 
may not run private commercial banks. As the Fed says in the procedures for electing directors,  Class 
B Directors, who are appointed by member banks (that is, private banks), but are meant to represent 
the interest of the public continue to vote on the regional bank president. In this way, private sector 
actors retain a stake in the selection of FOMC members. Directors–– Procedures for Elections of Class 
A and Class B Directors, FED. RESERVE,  http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/PDF/ 
procedure-for-elections-classes-a-b.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
 116.  See Mark F. Bernstein, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Government 
Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1989) (“The problems raised by a delegation to 
private individuals . . . suggest the need for closer scrutiny of the status of the FOMC’s privately 
appointed members.”). 
 117.  Canova, supra note 99, at 301 n.361 (crediting “the late John Hart Ely, for this description of 
the Federal Reserve”). 
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ranging from accounting standards set by the privately staffed Financial 
Accounting Standards Board to safety standards propounded by professional 
associations of engineers.118 It is to these sorts of precedents that the FOMC 
would be analogized, if the courts were, as is likely, looking to find a reason to 
conclude that the FOMC is constitutionally structured. 
E. Secrecy and the FOMC 
Because the FOMC’s deliberates in private on matters of great import to the 
public, the third area of consternation about the agency has involved its lack of 
transparency. This has also engaged the agency, if only modestly, with the legal 
system. 
The FOMC has been exempted from many of the open government 
requirements that apply to other administrative agencies, such as those imposed 
upon the government in the Sunshine Act.119 Although the FOMC is subject to 
FOIA, it regularly invokes the deliberative process exemption to deny 
journalists and others a right to listen into its meetings.120 
The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Federal Open Market 
Committee of the Federal Reserve System v. Merrill.121 The Court concluded that 
the agency’s directives, which were first directed to its trading desk before being 
disseminated more broadly, were exempt from FOIA as interagency 
memoranda. “We think that if the . . . Directives contain sensitive information 
not otherwise available, and if immediate release of these Directives would 
significantly harm the Government’s monetary functions or commercial 
interests, then a slight delay in the publication of the Directives . . . would be 
permitted.”122 
If the courts have exempted the FOMC from the tender mercies of FOIA, 
the committee’s relationship with the legislative branch has at times been more 
 
 118.  Moreover private delegations have been around for some time; in 1893, Congress delegated 
the power to establish a mandatory height for drawbars on railroad cars to the American Railway 
Association, upon the pain of the payment of a civil penalty. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the delegation. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 
281, 285–87 (1908); see also Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of 
Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2454 n.31 (2011) (discussing the history of the 
delegation to the American Railway Association). But see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the “delegation of lawmaking authority to the Commission is, 
in short, unsupported by any legitimating theory to explain why it is not a delegation of legislative 
power”). 
 119.  12 C.F.R. § 281.1 (describing the basis for the FOMC’s exemption from the statute is due to its 
status as a “separate and independent statutory body within the Federal Reserve System). 
 120.  BD. OF GOVS. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INTERPRETIVE LETTER RULING: RULES 
REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE, 1994 
WL 762911, at *1 (Feb. 1, 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)) (“Such deliberative, predecisional 
materials are exempt from disclosure as ‘inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that 
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.’”).  
 121.  Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill 443 U.S. 340, 342–43 (1979) (“The 
Federal Open Market Committee has a practice . . . of withholding certain monetary policy directives 
from the public during the month they are in effect.”). 
 122.  Id. at 363. 
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contentious. Congress has repeatedly threatened to require more disclosure 
from the committee.123 In practice, these sorts of threats are often the first resort 
of those dissatisfied with the policymaking of the committee. 
When, during the 1970s, inflation exposed the Fed to criticism from a 
number of sectors, Congress, in addition to occasionally engaging in single-
legislator lawsuits, imposed more reporting requirements on the FOMC.124 The 
committee was obliged to inform Congress of its targets, and its predictions for 
the economy, via a series of formal reports.125 But, as has been the case with the 
agency’s relationships with the courts, in the end, the FOMC has apparently 
convinced Congress that what it does is nothing that mere legislators could 
possibly hope to supervise.126 The Fed protested this threat to its independence 
and successfully managed to get the requirements removed in 2000.127 
In addition, in the 1990s, when Congress learned that the FOMC was taping 
and transcribing its meetings, it insisted that the transcripts be made public.128 
The Fed negotiated a five-year delay on that publication but acceded to 
Congress’s request (much to the benefit of the part of this article which relies 
on the transcripts of meetings).129 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The existence of legal protections of the independence of the FOMC that 
might be thought to amount to superprotections have not been wholly 
uncontroversial. But that superdiscretion has not made the committee 
unpredictable, or unbureaucratic. Instead, tradition has interestingly filled the 
gaping discretionary gap enjoyed by the agency. 
This regularization on some metric other than law, given law’s unavailability 
governing central bankers, may in part be due to the committee’s organic 
interest in regularity. The FOMC protects currency stability, and, as it turns out, 
 
 123.  For a recent history of these events, see MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42079, 
FEDERAL RESERVE: OVERSIGHT AND DISCLOSURE (2014).  
 124.  Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–523, 92 Stat. 1887 (“The 
Board of Governors shall include an explanation of the reasons for any revisions to or deviations from 
such objectives and plans.”).  
 125.  For a discussion, see JOHN B. TAYLOR, LEGISLATING A RULE FOR MONETARY POLICY 6 
(2011) available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/?q=/system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/10-
032_Paper_Taylor.pdf; Kara Karlson, Checks and Balances: Using the Freedom of Information Act to 
Evaluate the Federal Reserve Banks, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 213, 222 (2010) (“Originally, the Board was not 
required to report to Congress at all.”). 
 126.  For a discussion of this by a famous macroeconomist, see John Taylor, More on a Two-Track 
Plan to Restore Growth, ECON. ONE (Jan. 31, 2011), http://economicsone.com/2011/01/31/more-on-a-
two-track-plan-to-restore-growth/ (“In my view Congress should restore the Fed’s reporting 
requirements which it removed in the year 2000 in a little-known section of the American 
Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000.”). 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  See AUERBACH, supra note 11, at 87. 
 129.  Id.  
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stability is an important value for financial markets. The need for traditions and 
rules may simply be part and parcel of the job of central banking, meaning that 
if those rules will not be externally imposed, they may be internally adopted. 
Over time, consistencies have emerged over the course of the Fed’s 
existence that are quite predictable and that may even—although future 
research is required before any strong statements could be made—be amenable 
to some understanding of the relationship between that process and the efforts 
that the committee makes on the economy as a whole. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: federal funds rate 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged federal 
funds rate 0.938*** 0.889*** 0.881*** 0.880*** 0.881*** 
  (40.22) (28.74) (27.74) (27.05) (27.11) 
Year 
-–
0.0290* 
-–
0.0418* 
-–
0.0452* 
-–
0.0529** 
  (-–2.40) (-–2.45) (-–2.50) (-–2.89) 
    
Laughter  0.00692 0.00564 0.00820 
  (1.06) (0.65) (0.95) 
    
Transcript length 0.000606 
-–
0.00250 
  (0.29) (-–1.01) 
    
Number of 
attendees 0.0200* 
  (2.22) 
    
Constant 0.315* 58.40* 83.87* 90.80* 105.2** 
  (2.46) (2.41) (2.46) (2.51) (2.88) 
    
N 222 222 222 213 212 
adj. R-–sq 0.880 0.882 0.882 0.879 0.881 
    
t statistics in 
parentheses   
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Table 2 
 
  
Federal 
funds 
rate 
Lagged 
federal funds 
rate Laughter 
Transcript 
length 
 
Number of 
attendees 
  
Federal 
funds rate 1     
Lagged 
federal 
funds rate 
0.9366 1    
Laughter  -–0.36 -–0.3581 1   
Transcript 
length -–0.3089 -–0.3082 0.8175 1  
Number of 
attendees 
-–0.3465 -–0.3112 0.6113 0.7568 1 
 
